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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work
effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and
considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower
bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from
any date onward, and show, with this feature added, that the efficient
unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional
distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper thus provides a
simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question: what is
the tradeoff between equality and efficiency in resource allocation?
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and NBERIntroduction:
This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption
and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic
employment risk. Each period, each worker either finds or fails to
find a job opportunity. A worker who finds a job opportunity and
takes it produces output at the cost of some disutility of effort.
A worker who does not have a job opportunity does not work,
suffers no disutility of effort, and produces nothing. The presence
of a job opportunity is not observable by others, so a worker who
has ajob opportunity and chooses not to work is indistinguishable
from a worker who has no such opportunity. It is this element
of moral hazard that precludes the perfect pooling of job risk: in
providing insurance against this employment risk, the gains from
reducing consumption uncertainty need to be weighed against
the costs of reduced work incentives.
In. our formulation of this problem we impose a lower bound
on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any
agent from any date onward. With this feature added, weshow
under fairly general assumptions on preferences that the efficient
unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sec-
tional distribution of individual entitlements to utility: the econ-
omy as a whole has an efficient steady state distribution,within
which the fortunes of any individual family rise or fall depend-
2ing on its idiosyncratic luck. The paper thus provides a simple
prototype model suited to the study of the normative question:
what is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency in resource
allocation?
The context we use for examining this issue is a simplified
version of the frameworks used by Albrecht and Axell (1984) and
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) to study unemployment insur-
ance. Our model lacks several realistic features that are incorpo-
rated into these earlier studies. Our model, in contrast to Hansen
and Imrohoroglu's model, is not capable of matching dataon
the typical length of employment and unemployment spells, and,
in contrast to Aibrecht and Axell's model, it is not well suited
for the study of the impact of unemployment insurance on the
McCall-like determination of a reservation wage. We focus in-
stead on a feature of the efficient allocation of consumption and
work effort that these earlier papers do not consider: the depen-
dence of the efficient allocation of current consumption and work
effort on a worker's employment history. This dependencewas
first explored in Townsend (1980) and Radner (1981). Usami
(1983) is an early application of these ideas to the problem of
unemployment insurance.
Our formulation of this economy's efficiency problem is taken
from Atkeson and Lucas (1992). We take as the state of the
3system a utility distribution —adistribution of households by
the expected discounted utility each is to receive from the cur-
rent period on. We define an allocation, and then define, for
any given utility distribution, the cost of that distribution as the
smallest (over all allocations) net, constant inflow of resources
needed to attain the utilities in the given distribution. Since we
deal with a closed system, the set of utility distributions that
can be attained with zero cost are on the frontier of the utility
possibility set for this economy, and the allocations which attain
these distributions are efficient. Following our previous paper,
we show that the efficient allocation can be decentralized in a
fashion that connects this efficiency problem to the one-on-one
principal-agent problem studied by Green (1987) and many oth-
ers. In this one-on-one principal-agent problem, the state variable
is simply the discounted expected utility the agent is to receive
from the current period on, and the principal's objective is to
minimize the resource cost to himself of providing that utility,
where this cost is measured according to some set of intertempo-.
ral prices or interest rates. The solution to the original efficiency
problem is then found through a process of varying the interest
rates the representative principal. faces until, period by period,
the net resource use implied by the solution to the one-on-one
principal-agent problem is set equal to zero. A similar procedure
4is followed in Taub (1990).
Thomasand Worrall (1990) and Atkeson and Lucas (1992)
show that, if agents can give up all claims to discounted expected
utility for the sake of current consumption, then the solution to
the one-on-one principal-agent problem implies that the limiting
distribution of agents' wealth and consumption is degenerate,
with a vanishing fraction of the population consuming all output
in the economy. In light of this result, the efficiency standard
used by Albrecht and Axell and Hansen and Irnrohoroglu of ex-
amining the costs of various unemployment insurance schemes at
the steady state distribution of consumption makes little sense in
a setting in which each worker's unemployment benefits can de-
pend on his individual history of employment and unemployment
and each worker can trade away in the limit all of his claims to
future consumption for the sake of current consumption. In this
paper, we address this problem by imposing a limit on the ex-
tent to which workers can trade future for current consumption.
In particular, we impose the constraint that there is a minimum
entitlement to discounted expected utility from the beginning of
each period on that each agent must receive. We interpret this
con•straint as a limit on the extent to which living members of
an infinitely lived household in our economy can sell the con-
sumption claims of their heirs. It is important to remember that
5this constraint is an additional constraint imposed upon our ef-
ficiency problem and is not derived directly from any efficiency
consideration. We find that the solution to the one-on-one prin-
cipal agent problem with this additional constraint does imply a
non-degenerate steady state distribution of consumption.
For any given interest rate for the principals, the resource
cost of the steady-state cross-sectional distribution of utility enti-
tlements implied by the solution to the one-on-one principal agent
problem is determined by the balancing of two forces, with the
relative strength of these forces being determined by the size of
the interest rate. When agents have relatively high entitlements,
so that the minimum entitlement constraint is not binding, then
the first order conditions of the one-on-one principal agent prob-
lem imply that the marginal cost to the principal of providing the
agent with his entitlement to discounted expected utility follows
a sub-martingale. For example, in the case that agents have
time additive preferences with momentary utility of the form
u(c) =cV2,this implies that agent's current consumption fol-
lows a random walk with downward drift. In general, with time
additive utility with concave momentary utility, agents' current
consumption follows a qualitatively similar process. The down-
ward drift in the process governing agents' current consumption
and entitlements is thus a force that pushes all agents in the long
6run down upon the minimum entitlement constraint, with the
push being greater the lower the interest rate.
The second and balancing force is provided by the mini-
mum entitlement constraint itself. When interest rates are very
low, this minimum entitlement becomes an absorbing state of
the Markov process governing the evolution of individual agents'
entitlements, so that, in the limit, all agents end up stuck on this
constraint. But if the job opportunity is sufficiently productive,
a steady state with all agents at the minimum entitlement entails
an excess supply of goods. As the interest rate is increased, the
minimum entitlement ceases to be an absorbing state, as agents
who have this entitlement and report a job opportunity in essence
save some of their earnings and thus raise their entitlement from
next period on. In this case, the steady state distribution of en-
titlements has only some fraction of the population at the miii-
imum entitlement, with that fraction being determined by the
interest rate. With these results, we can then pose our original
efficiency problem as one of finding the interest rate for the prin-
cipal in a one-on-one principal agent problem such that the net
resource cost of the corresponding steady state distribution of
entitlements of utility is zero.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
we present the model, define our efficiency problem, and estab-
7lish the connection between our original efficiency problem and a
one-on-one principal agent problem. In sections 3 and 4, we char-
acterize the solution to that one-on-one principal agent problem.
In section 5, we analyze the Markov process of entitlements gen-
erated by the solution to the one-on-one principal agent problem
and demonstrate that the steady-state level of resource use is a
continuous, increasing function of the interest rate, thus estab-
lishing the existence of a market clearing interest rate. In section
6, we conclude.
2. The Model:
Time is denoted by t =0,1, 2 Each period, each agent
finds a job opportunity with probability ir and fails to find such
an opportunity with probability 1 —ir.An agent who finds a
job can work h E [0, 1] units of time. We assume that job op-
portimities are independently and identically distributed both
across agents and across time. Agents who consume resources c
and work h hours within the current period obtain flow utility
(1 —j3)(U(c)
—hv),where U : —÷DR and v > 0, the
disutility of work, is a fixed parameter. Let C(u), C: D —+
bethe inverse of the flow utility function U(c). We assume that
C is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
convex, with inf€D C(u) =0.
At each date t ￿ 0 agents are distinguished by their names
8D andtheir history of reported job opportunities z
(z0, z1, . . . , Zr). Weassume zE{O, 1} for all t and we use z2= 0
to indicate a report of no job opportunity and zj= 1to indi-
cate a report of a job opportunity in the current period t. We
use w0interchangeablyto denote an agent's name and his ini-
tial entitlement to discounted expected utility. At each date t, a
hypothetical social planner assigns each agent of each type some
current level of consumption C(x)(somecurrent flow utility from
consumption Xj)andassigns each agent who reports a job oppor-
tunity some hours of work h.Anallocation in this environment
is thus a sequence of functions
0=
whereXtmapsagents' initial entitlements wo and histories of
reports ztintolevels of current utility in D,whilehmapsthese
same variables into the interval [0, 1].
Givenan allocation o,anagent chooses a strategy for re-
porting job opportunities to maximize the discounted expected
utility he obtains under that allocation. This strategy is de-
noted by z= {z(Ot)}, whereO =(°o,Oi,...,O), O E{0,1}
for all t ￿ 0, denotes the agent's true job experience. We use
et+l ={0,1} x {0, 1} x ...x{0, 1} to denote the space of possible
job histories up through time t, i'todenote the distribution of
9O E et+1generatedby ir, z1(9t) to denote the choice of report at
time tasa function of history O, and zt(9t)todenote the history
of reports up through time tinducedby a reporting strategy z
andhistory 9. We assume that an agent cannot report a job
opportunity if he does not have one. That is, we assume that for
all t,zj(0t) =0if °1= 0.
An agent's initial discounted expected utility can be written





Let z={z(0t)}0,where4(91)=0for all t￿0 and O e
e2-'-', denotethe truthful reporting strategy. We use the notation
U1(wo, o, z, 9t_1)todenote the discounted expected utility from
date tonreceived under the allocation o by an agent who was
originally entitled to w0 E D, has reported employment history
t—1E et upto date t,andwho uses the truthful reporting
strategy f.
We impose four conditions on allocations. The first requires
that o delivers wo to those entitled to wo:
wo =U(wo,c,z), (2.1)
10for all w0 E D. The second is incentive compatibility:
U(wo,o,z*) ￿ U(wo,az) (2.2)
for all w0 E D and all reporting strategies z. The third is a
lower bound on the discounted expected utility that an agent
can receive after any employment history:
Ut(wo,o,z',O') ￿ (2.3)
for all t￿1, wo E D,O'E 9. The fourth is an upper bound
on the discounted expected utility that an agent can expect in
the tail of the allocation:
lim/3 sup Uj(wo,ti,z,O')=O (2.4) t—00
Anallocation o is said to attain a distribution of entitle-
ments 'b0 with transfers i-if(2.1)-(2.4) are satisfied and if the
allocation o never requires a net infusion of resources greater
than 'r:
f
{C[x(wo,Ot)1 —Oth(wo,Ot)y}ddbo￿ r (2.5)
Dx8*+I
forall t >0. Anallocation is said to be efficient if it attains a
distributionwith transfers r and there is no other allocation
that attains o with transfers less than r.
11Following Atkeson and Lucas (1992), prices can be used to
decentralize the overall problem of finding efficient allocations
into component planning problems. To define what we mean by
a "component planning problem", consider a planner responsi-
ble for allocating resources only to those who are initially en-
titled to expected utility w0. He assigns an allocation (spe-
cific to w0) o(w0)= {Xt(WQ, 9i),h2(wo,Ot)}, Xt: —+D,
ei+l —+[0,1] in such a way as to minimize the value of the
total resources he allocates, with resources at each date valued
at prices determined by the sequence {qj}0, qt(0, 1). The
objective for this planner is to choose a(w0) to minimize
(1 —qo)f {C[xo(wo, 9)] —Oho(wo,O)y}da+ (2.6)
—q)fiq3 {C[x(w0,Qt)] — 9h(wo,9t)y}d,t1
where 0(wO) is chosen subject to the constraints (2.1)-(2.4). It is
as if consumers are grouped by their initial w0 values, with each
group represented by its own social planner, and then these plan-
ners trade certain claims to current and future resources among
themselves at prices given by {qj}0.
The next result, essentially Theorem 1 of Atkeson and Lu-
cas (1992), provides one connection between these component
12planning problems (2.6) and the problem of finding efficient al-
locations.
Theorem 1. Suppose there exist an allocation a' ={x(w0,ot),
hj(wo, Ot)}r0,prices{qj}, a distribution of entitlements ,
andtransfers r such that
(i) at prices {q2}), for all w0 E D, a'(wO) minimizes (2.6)
subject to (2.1)-(2.4);
(ii) for all t,(2.5)holds with equality;
(iii) (1 —qo)+ —qt)fl10q, < +00.
Then the allocation a- attains l'o with transfers r and is efficient.
Proof: That a' attains o with transfers r is immediate. We
prove that a- is efficient by contradiction. Suppose that there
exists some other allocation & ={t(wO,Ut), t(WO, Ut)} that






forall t, with the difference between these two quantities being
at least r —. Then,
(1 —qo)f {C[o(wo, 0)] —0h(wo,O)y]}d+
13— t) Hq, f {C[(wo, Ot)J —Otiz(wo,Ot)y}d
<(1_qo)f{C[xo(woO)]—Oho(wo,O)y]}dp+
—qt)fi q8 f {C[x(w0, 9t)]— Oh(wo,Ot)y}dt' <+oo
where the last inequality follows from (iii). This contradicts the
hypothesis (i) that o(wo)minimizes(2.6) for each wo.
Theorem 1 is an analogue to the first theorem of welfare
economics, with conditions (i)-(iii) defining the counterpart to a
competitive equilibrium. Condition (i) requires quantities to be
optimal (cost minimizing) for each w, given prices; condition (ii)
is market clearing; and condition (iii) is a boundedness condition
on prices.
We do not have a general method for obtaining price se-
quences {qj}0 that will clear these markets among planners.
In the sections that follow, we develop a procedure for finding
a price q and a distribution of entitlements 'çbq that prevails in
a steady state. That is, we develop a procedure to find a con-
stant sequence of prices all equal to q, an allocation 0q,anda
distribution of entitlements q,suchthat these objects satisfy
the conditions of Theorem 1 with r =0.
143. A Recursive Formulation of the Problem:
In this section we define and study a Bellman equation that
characterizes solutions to the component planning problem (2.6)
when the price sequence {qj}0 is constant at fixed q E {,3, 1).
In section 4, we use this Bellman equation to characterize the
dynamics of consumption and employment under the cost mini-
mizing unemployment insurance scheme at constant price q. In
section 5, we use this characterization of consumption and em-
ployment dynamics to find a distribution of entitlements Jq that
prevails in the steady state at constant price q. This result gives
us, for each q E [8, 1), a constant price sequence {q }, an
allocation 0q,adistribution of entitlements bq, and a level of
transfers r(q) that satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 1.
The function T on Ddefinedby setting q(wo)equalto the
imfimum of (2.6) over allocations that satisfy (2.1)-(2.4) when
prices are constant at q is clearly unbounded. In defining our
Bellman equation, our approach will be to set an upper bound
IIYonentitlements and to consider cost functions on the bounded
set D =[,J. We formulate and study the Bellman equation on
C(D),whereC(D)isthe space of bounded, continuous functions
on b, and obtain the corresponding optimal policy functions.
Then we will show that if the bound I1 is chosen large enough,
it will not be binding for any initial entitlements w0 E D,so
15that our optimal policy functions are also cost minimizing for
the original, unbounded problem (2.6) for any such w0.
The Bellman Equation is specified as follows. Define the




q[7rV(g(1)) + (1 —ir)V(g(O))]





[irg(1) + (1 —ir)g(0)], (3.2)
(1 —,8)[u(1) —lv]+/3g(1) ￿ (1— )u(0) +Bg(0). (3.3)
The constraint (3.2) requires that an agent entitled to dis-
counted expected utility w from the current period on receives
that utility. it is analogous to (2.1). The constraint (3.3) is
a single-period version of the incentive compatibility constraint
(2.2). It requires that agents who plan to report their future
job opportunities truthfully also find it optimal to report their
current job opportunity truthfully.
Lemma 3.1 The operator Tq has a unique fixed point V, in
C(D), and, for all V C(D), lim,c, TV= T'.The function
16V' isincreasing and convex. For all w E D,theinfimum on the
right hand side of (3.1) is attained.
Proof: The proof is standard. Applying Tqinvolvesmini-
mizing a continuous function over a compact set and Theorems
4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) apply. 1
We obtain further facts about the value function V and
about the minimizing policies Uq, 1q 9q by studying the sequence
of functions {TC}O,whereC is the inverse of the momentary
utility function U, and then applying the fact that this sequence
converges to Vq. To this end, we establish some facts about TqV
whenV is any convex function in C(D).
Lemma 3.2 For any convex V C(D), the minimum on
the right hand side of (3.1) can be attained at a point at which
the incentive constraint (3.3) holds with equality.
Proof: Suppose (3.1) is minimized at a point (u, l,g) such
that (3.3) is slack. Then, since C is strictly convex, u(1) =u(O),
and thus, by (3.3), 9g(1) —(1
—j3)lv> 13g(O). Since V is convex,
with 1 fixed it is possible to choose a> 0 to raise (0) =g(0)+ a
and lower (1) =g(1)
—auntil (3.3) binds without raising the
right hand side of (3.1). I
In view of this lemma, the two constraints (3.2) and (3.3)
17can be replaced by the equalities




It then follows that for any convex V E C(D) and w eD, TqV
satisfies
TV(w) = (3.6)
min(1 —q)[lrC(W + lv) + (1 —ir)C(
—3g(0)
(1 —q)lv+ q[irV(g(1)) + (1 —ir)V(g(0))]
withg: {0,1} —+D and1 E [0,1].
Lemma 3.3: For any strictly increasing and strictly convex
V E C(D) and any w E L, the minimum on the right hand side of
(3.6) is attained by a unique 1(w), g(w, 0) (and hence u(w, 0)) and
these functions are continuous. Furthermore, TqV is continuous,
strictly increasing, and strictly convex.
Proof: For each w E D,theright hand side of (3.6) is
continuous in the arguments 1, g(O). The arguments 1 and g(0)
are restricted to lie in closed intervals. Since C is strictly convex
and V is convex, these choices are unique. By the Theorem of
the Maximum, TqV is continuous. That TqV is strictly increasing
and strictly convex follows from the assumed properties of V and
C'
18For any convex, differentiable V E C(D) ,thefirst order
conditions that characterize the minimizing choice of 1, g(O) in-
clude
—/ig(w, 1)+ l(w)v) — 0if 1(w) E (0,1),
1—13 v
CF(W
—13g(w, 1)+ l(w)v) —<0 if 1(w) =1, (3.7)
1—13 v
C#(W
—13g(w, 1)+ l(w)v)—>0 if 1(w) =0.
1—13 v
The intertemporal first order conditions are given by
+Ol(w)v) ￿ (3.8) 1—3
0=0,1,
/3(1—q)




(1—q) _________ _________ ____ (w,1) _______
(1-13)
[lrCl(W + l(w)v) + (1- )C1(w-
13g(w, 0))]
1—13
Inthe next two lemmas, we show that ifis large enough,
the upper bound on entitlements does not bind the optimal policy
functions 9q.Tothis end we analyze the sequence of functions
q E C(D) for all ii,definedby V°(w) =C(w)and
19V1(w) (TqVq')(w), n ￿ 0. On each iteration n, we denote
the optimal choice of 1,g byl,,9,,.
Lemma3.4: Assume that qE[3,1). Define w0 to be the
solution to C'(w°)=y/v and assume w0 >. Thenthe optimal
policy functions fin satisfy:
(i) g,,(w, 1) and g,,(w,0)are non-decreasing functions with
g,,(w, 1) ￿ g,,(w, 0) for all w, and
(ii) for all n, g,,(w, 0)￿w when w ￿ V)0.
Proof:Given that CandV1"areconvex, (3.8) gives the
result (i). Result (ii) is proved by induction. Begin with the case
with n = 0 and= C.Ifgo(w,1)=for w ￿ w0 then the
induction hypothesis is immediate. When w ￿ w0 and g0(w, 1)> ,then(3.8) holds with equality. Since q ￿ /3, substituting
from the right hand side of (3.8) into the left hand side of (3.7)
implies that 1(w) = 0 if go(w, 1) ￿ w0. Thus (3.8) implies that
.go(w,1)￿ w for w ￿ w0. Since go(w, 1) ￿ go(w, 0) for all w, this
proves the induction hypothesis for n = 0.
Now assume that result (ii) holds for n—i. Again, if it is the
case that g,,(w, 1) = w for w ￿ w0 then the induction hypothesis
is immediate. When w ￿ w0 and g,,(w, 1) > w, then (3.8) holds






Bythe induction hypothesis, g_i(g(W, 1),0)￿ .gn(W,1)when
gn(w,1)￿w°, so that, since q ￿ 3
￿ C'(g,(w,1)) (3.11)
when 9(W,1)￿ w0. Thus, by (3.7) and (3.8), l(w) =0when
g(w,1) >w°.Finally, by (3.8) and (3.11), g(w,1) w when
9n(W,1)￿ w°. Thus, the induction hypothesis is proved for n.
We sum up the implications of these results for the Bellman
equation (3.1) in the following result.
Lemma 3.5Assumethat C'(w) <y/vand C'(i) >y/v.
Then for q E [8,1), V,—theunique fixed point of 1 —isstrictly
increasing, strictly convex, and continuously differentiable, with
a derivative given by (3.9). The policy functions ,o =(us,1q gq)
are continuous and satisfy properties (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.4.
Proof: That V, is strictly increasing and strictly convex fol-
lows from Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3, as do the existence and continuity
of the policy functions.
By Theorem 3.8 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, the se-
quence {u, i, g} defined above in Lemma 3.4 converges uni-
formly to =(uq,1q gq). Hence 9q satisfies properties (i) and
21(ii) of Lemma 3.4. It also follows that the sequence of derivatives
{dV'/dw} defined in (3.9) converges uniformly to the expression
given on the right hand side of (3.9) evaluated at2q.Since {V'}
converges uniformly to V, the expression (3.9) is the derivative
of V,. It is evidently continuous.O
We now relate the solution to the Bellman equation (3.1)
to the solution to the component planning problem (2.6). First
note that a policy function p =(u(w,O),l(w),g(w, 0)) can be
used to generate an allocation o in the following manner. Let
x0(w0, 0) =u(w0,0) and ho(wo, 0) =01(wo)for all w0 E D,
oE{O,1}. Define wi(wo,0) =g(wo,0)for all w0 E D, U E
{O, 1}. Iterating on this procedure to complete the definition, set
xj(wo,ot) =U(Wt(U)O, Ut_i), o) h(w0, ot) =Ol(w(wo,ot_1)),and
Wt+i(WO,Ut)= g(wt(wo,Oi_i),ot)for all t ￿ 1, 1110D, 9 e-'-1.
Lemma 3.6 Assume that C'(Ei) > y/v. For any q [8,1),
letbethe policy function that minimizes (3.1) subject to the
constraints (3.2) and (3.3) and 0q be the allocation generated
by Pq Then, for any wo D,wo<I1J, oq(wo) minimizes (2.6)
subject to constraints (2.1)-(2.4).
Proof: By Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, Theorems 4.3, 4.4,
and 4.5, for all w0 Vq(wo) equalsthe infimum of (2.6),












(1—18)x(wo,(Ut_1,0)) +/3U2+i(wo,o z,(U', 0))
for all t ￿ 0, O Moreover,the allocation cr(wo) uniquely
attains the minimum on the set satisfying (3.12)-(3.14).
By Lemma 3.4, cq(wo) satisfies (2.4). By the argument of
Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, the set of values
of (2.6) (at price sequence {qj}) that can be attained with
allocations satisfying (2.1)-(2.4) is the same as the set of values
of (2.6) than can be attained with allocations satisfying (3.13),
(3.14), and (2.4). Thus, 0q(wo) uniquelyattainsthe minimum of
(2.6) subject to (2.1)-(2.4) and the additional constraint
U1(wo,o.,z*,Ut_l)￿1J (3.15)
23for alit0,
Finally, Lemma 3.5 and the hypothesis C'(iii)> y/vimply
that the inequality (3.15) is never binding on aq(wo) for w0 <.
Sincethe constraint set (2.1)-(2.4) is convex, this implies that
oq(wo) minimizes (2.6) among the set of allocations satisfying
(2. 1)-(2.4) .0
4.Characterization of the Policy Functions
In this section we characterize the policy functions gq(w, 0)
andlq(w) and then analyze the Markov process in entitlements
generated by these policy functions.
The behavior of .gq(w, 9) and lq(w) as functions of w on the
interval [,oo)is drawn in Figure 1 and can be described as
follows. Provided that
C'(+v) <y/v, (4.1)
there is an interval [,w9on which lq(w) =1,an interval (w, w)
on which lq(w)(0, 1), and an interval [w, oo) on which lq(w) =
0.The value Wq' is determined as the solution to the equation
—,Bg(w', 1) C'( q
1—j3
q+v) =y/v, (4.2)
where gq(wq1 ,1)solves the equation
—),
8(1—)V(9)=Y/v. (4.3)
24Condition (4.1) guarantees that w > j. The valueis deter-
mined as the solution to the equation
C'( -gq(w,1)) =y/v, (4.4)
where gq(w, 1) solves the equation (4.3) (and is thus equal to
gq(wq', 1)). For entitlements w ￿ w, the resource cost of com-
pensating an agent for the disutility of work is less than that
agent's product on the job. Thus, no agent with such high en-
titlements works and gq(w, 1)gq(w, 0) for all w ￿ w. For all
w E (wi', w), gq(w, 1) is constant at the value that solves equa-
tion (4.3) and lq(w) decreases in w from 1 to 0 SO as to preserve
the equality (3.4).
Figure 1 is drawn so that the curve gq(w, 0) lies everywhere
below the 45 degree line, while gq(w, 1) lies above the 45 degree
line on the interval [w, w] and crosses that line in the interval
(w, w). The first of these features is necessary given the as-
sumptions we have already made; the second feature is not. The
next two lemmas describe the possibilities.
Lemma 4.1: Assume q> i3. If gq(w, 1) and gq(w, 0) are the
policy functions that minimize (3.6), then
(i) there exists some 5> 0 and Ic > 0 such that gq(w, 0) =
forall w E [,w+ 5) and gq (w, 0) ￿ w —Icfor all w E (w +5, w};
25(ii) 1) >wif and only if
C'(w + v)> + v) + (1 —ir)C'(w)] (4.5)
holds at w =w.
Proof: To verify (i), use (3.8), (3.9) and the result that
gq(w, 1) ￿ gq(w, 0) for all w to conclude that if .gq(w, 0) > w then
V'(w) =
[irV'(gq(w,
1)) + (1 —ir)V'(gq(w,0))]. (4.6)
If g,(w,0) ￿ w for w > ,then(4.6) implies that V'(w) ￿
V'(w). Since q> 9, this is a contradiction. Thus gq(w, 0) <W
forall w > w. To prove (i), observe that, by the continuity of
V'(.), there must exist some Ic> 0 such that
V'(w) ￿ V'(w —k)
for all w E [,w].Using the same argument above, for all
w E [,w],(4.6) cannot hold with gq(w, 0) > unless gq(w, 0) ￿
w—k. Thusgq(w,0)>impliesgq(w,O) ￿ w—kandgq(w,0)=
for w E {, + Ic). Since 9q(w,0) is continuous and non-
decreasing in w, gq(w, 0) =wover an interval and result (i) is
proved.
To prove (ii), note that gq(i,O) =. Thus,(3.8) and (3.9)
imply that if 9q(, 1) =was well, then (4.5) fails to hold at
26w =w.Thus, if (4.5) does hold at w =, thengq(, 1) >W.
Conversely,if (4.5) fails to hold at w =j,then it cannot be the
case that (3.8) and (3.9) are satisfied with some gq(w,1)>w.V.
Lemma 4.1 does not cover the case q =/3.We treat this case
separately in the next result.
Lemma 4.2: Assume q =/3. Ifgq(w, 1) and gq(w, 0) are the
policy functions that minimize (3.6), then
(i) there exists k >0such that .qq(w, 1) ￿ w + k for all
wE[w,wq'];
(ii)gq(w, 1) =wfor all wE [wq1, w]; and
(iii) gq(W, 1) =gq(w,0) =w forall w￿w.
Proof:Equations (3.8) and (3.9) imply
V'(w) ￿ irV'(gq(w, 1)) + (1 —ir)V'(gq(w, 0)). (4.7)
For w E[, w],lq(w) =1,and thus (3.8) and the strict concav-
ity of C and V imply that gq(w, 1) is uniformly bounded above
gq(w, 0) on this interval. Thus, if gq(W, 1) =wfor some w E
{w,w], then gq(w, 0) <w and by the strict convexity of T', (4.7)
implies the contradiction w) <V'(w).Since condition (4.5)
is automatically satisfied when q =/3,gq(w, 1) > .Thus,by
the continuity of gq(w, 1), gq(w, 1) >wfor all w E [w, w]. Since
gq(w,1) is uniformly bounded above gq(w,0), for all wE
27(4.7) implies that gq(w,1)is uniformly bounded above w on this
interval. Thus, (i) is proved.
Result (iii) is proved by the observation that V(w) C(w)
with gq(w,1)=.qq(w,0) =wfor all w ￿ solves the Bellman
equation (3.6) when q =3.
Equations (3.7) and (3.8) imply that gq(w, 1) is constant for
all w E [w, w]. Thus (ii) is implied by (iii).g
5. Analysis of the Entitlement Process
The previous section completes the characterization of the
value and the policy functions which solve the Bellman equation
(3.1) for any ftxed q[/3,1).We now turn to the study of the
Markov processes defined by the job finding probability ir and the
policy functions gq(w, 0). For any q E [SB, 1), the state space of the
entitlement process is [,oo).If q >/3, theresults in section 3
imply that the ergodic sets of this process must be subsets of the
set [,w}.If q =/3, thenthere is at least one ergodic set in the
interval [,w],but it also the case that every point w ￿ w is
also an ergodic set. To take all of these possibilities into account,
we first study the processes generated by (ir, .gq(w, 0)) on the set
S =[w,wJ and then deal with the additional possibilities that
arise when q =
LetA be any probability measure on the Borel sets S of S,
28and define the Markov operator Pq by
(PA)(A) =fd+(1_)f (gq(w,1)EA) (.qq(w,O)EA)
for any A S.
Lemma 5.1: Assume q E [8, 1). The process (ir, gq(w, 0))
has a unique invariant distribution ibq in (S, S), the unique fixed
point of Pq, and for any probability measure .\,Pconverges to
?,bq in the total variation norm.
Proof: The proof is divided into two cases: q E (p8, 1) and
q =/3.In both cases, the proof is an application of Theorem
11.12 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989).
Part 1: Assume q e(/3, 1).Let X,, be the probability mea-
sure that concentrates mass on the point w. We show that there
exist N ￿ 1 and 6> 0 such that (Pq'w)(w) ￿ for all w S.
By result (i) of Lemma 4.1, there exists k > 0 such that either
gq(w, 0) ￿ w —kor gq(w, 0) =wfor all w E [w, w]. Choose
N large enough so that —Nk< j. Then the probability
of passing from the point w to the point w in N steps (that is
is at least (1 _ir)N. Since gq(w, 0) is non-decreasing
in w, this transition tois at least as probable from any other
point in S, so letting 6 =(1
—ir)",the proof that the Markov
process under study satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 11.12 in
Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) is complete.
29Part 2: The proof in the case with q =fi isslightly different.
In this case, we show that there exist N ￿ 1 and > 0 such that
(pN)(w) ￿ for all w E S. By result (1) of Lemma 4.2, there
exists k> 0 such that g(w,1) ￿ w+Jc for all w E[,w'].By
result (ii), g(w, 1) =forall w E [w, w]. Choose N large
enough so that w + (N —1)k> w. Then the probability of
passing from the pointto the point w in N steps (that is
P(\)(w)) is at least irN. Since 9q(W, 1) is non-decreasing in
w, this transition tois at least as probable from any other
point in S, so letting E =irs,the proof that the Markov process
under study satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 11.12 in Stokey,
Lucas, and Prescott (1989) is complete.
In view of Lemma 5.1, the function
r(q) =f
Vq(w)th,bq
is well-defined for q E [8, 1). The function r has the interpret a-
tion as the constant, net inflow of resources required to attain the
entitlement distribution liq in the steady state. In the rest of this
section we provide conditions under which r(q) =0is satisfied
for a price q E [8, 1). We first examine the values of this function
at q =/3and q near one. Then we establish the continuity of r
(Lemmas 5.2-5.4). Finally, we establish that r(q) is decreasing
in q (Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6).
30In the case that q =/3,the point w is an absorbing state,
and, as shown in the proof of Lemma 5.1, part 2, the probability
of transiting from any other point in the state space toin N
steps is strictly positive. Thus the unique invariant distribution
in this case is concentrated at the point w. At this point, no
one works, so the cost of attaining this distribution in the steady
state is r(,3) =C(w).This cost is clearly greater than zero.
In the case that q> /3and
C(w + v) ￿ + v) + (1 —ir)C'(w)]
forq close to one, then gq(, 1) =w, andwisan absorbing state.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 5.1, part 1, the probability of
transiting from any other point in the state space to in N steps
is strictly positive. Thus, the unique invariant distribution in this
case is concentrated at the point w. At this point, everyone who
has a job opportunity works l() =1,so the cost of attaining
this distribution in the steady state is
limr(q) =irC(+ v) + (1 —ir)C()
—lry.
q—1
i is too large relative to y and ir, then this cost is also positive
and there is no market clearing price q. We assume that this
quantity is negative.
31Lemma 5.2 Let q E [fi,1)and {q}0, q E [8, 1) be a
sequence of prices converging to q. Then converges uni-
formly to V, on [,w].
Proof: We show that —V,
—*0as q' —q.For all
n ￿ 1,
Sinceis a contraction mapping with fixed point Vqi, IIVq —
—÷ 0as ii—boofor all values of q and q'. The term
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Tqiisa con-
traction mapping with modulus q'. Thus, as n —00,7'V—V
converges to a quantity less than or equal to j—!?jIT(?sV—
SinceV =7,the result that JTsV — —p 0as q' —q
follows from the observation that the operator Tq is continuous
in q by the Theorem of the Maximum.O
Lemma 5.3 Let {(q,w)}0, qnE[8,1),w E be
a sequence converging to the point (q, w). Then the sequence
{(gq,(wn,1),gq,(wn,O))}o converges to (gq(w,1),gq(w,0)).
Proof: Since the policy functions gq(w, 0)are continuous in
w,for all f > 0, there exists an N ￿ 1 such that .gq(wn, 0) —
gq(w,)I<f,0 =0,1, for all n ￿ N. By Lemma 5.2 and Stokey,
32Lucas, and Prescott (1989), Theorem 3.8, for all E>0, there
exists an N ￿ 1 such that for n ￿ N, 9q(W,0)
—gq(w,0)1<E,
0=0,1,for all w E {w,w]. Thus, for all E>0, there exists an
N ￿ 1 such that gq(wn,0) 9q(w,0)1 < for all ri ￿ Nj
Lemma 5.4 r(q) is continuous on [3, 1).
Proof: By Lemma 5.1 and Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott
(1989), Theorem 12.13, if {q}0convergesto q, then
convergesto weakly to 'çbq. By Lemma 5.2, {V} converges
uniformly to V, on [,w].Thus the lemma is proved.g
Lemma 5.5 II q'> q, then '￿ (where herede-
notes first order stochastic dominance).
Proof: We first use the first order conditions to show that
the optimal policies gq(w, 0)aredecreasing in q. Then we use
this fact to prove the lemma.
Let q' > q. For ii￿1, let= and be the
associated optimal policies. We first use an induction to show





For n =1,q'> q implies
q'(1—/3)dV>q(1—3)dV (52) ,3(1—q')dw3(1—q)dw
33Hence (3.8) implies that g1(w, 0) ￿ gq(w,0)for all w and (5.1) is
proved for U =0and n =1.From (4.2) —(4.4)and the fact that
the functions g(w, 0) and gq(w, 0) are non-decreasing in w, the
points w and w decrease as q is increased, so that li(w) ￿ l(w)
for all w. If li(w) =lq(w)=1or l1(w) =lq(w)0, then (3.8)
and (5.2) imply gj(w, 1) ￿ gq(w, 1) and (5.1). If l1(w) < l,(w) =
1,then (5.1) follows directly from (3.7). If li(w), lq(w) E (0, 1),
then (3.7) implies that (5.1) holds as an equality. Finally, if
11(w) =0and lq(w) > 0, then (5.1) follows again from (3.7).
Hence, (5.1) holds for all w D when n =1.











1)+ lq(w)v) + (1 —ir)C'('f3gq(w, 0))]
q(1—/3)dV(w)
j3(1—q) dw
for all w D. Then, (3.8) implies that g1v÷i(w,0)￿ .gq(w, 0).
When 9 =1,the reasoning used in the case n =1implies
1N+1(W) ￿ lq(V), gN+1(w, 1) ￿ gq(w, 1), and that (5.1) holds
34for n =N+ 1. Thus, if q' >q,then gqi(w, 0) ￿ .qq(w, 0) for all
w E Oand0 =0,1.
Now let=(Pbq)where bq is the invariant distribution
of entitlements corresponding to price q. From the result above,
=(Pqi,bq)￿ (Pqbq)= J)q. SincePqi is monotone and￿ q,
for n ￿ 1, A' ￿ ) ￿ By Lemma 5.1, {}— inthe
total variation norm, so the lemma is proved.
Lemma 5.6r(q) is decreasing in q.
Proof: By definition,
r(q) =fV(w)dhq (5.3)
f {(1 — q)[C(uq(w, 0)) — Olq(w)y] + qVq(gq(w,
Dx8







{C(u(w, 0)) — Glq(w)y}d/1dbq.(5.6)
35Now consider changing the price q to q' and calculating the inte-
gral f(TqsVq)(w)dq. Let uo, lo,go be the optimal controls asso-
ciated with the determination of Tq' V, so that
f(Tq'Vq)(w)dIJq =
f {(1 -q')[C(uo(w,0)) -Olo(w)y}+ q/V(go(w,
Dxe
Sinceu0, minimize the right hand side of (3.1),
f {(1 —q')[C(uo(w,9)) —Olo(w)y]+ q' Vq(go(w,
Dxe
￿f {(1 —q')[C(uq(w,0)) —Olq(w)yJ+ q'V(gq(w, 0))}dpdbq. Dxe
Thus, by (5.5) and (5.6), f(Tq'Vq)(w)d'çbq ￿ fVq(W)dLiq. Let
= 1jVq and V?' =T,V? for all n ￿ 1. Let be the
optimal policies associated with evaluating T1 V?.
We prove JD Vqi(w)dbq ￿ fDVq(w)di,l'qby induction. As an
induction hypothesis, assume that fV?(w)th,bq ￿ fVq(w)dibq.
By (5.4),
f v'(gq(w,9))d/ith,1iq (5.7) Dxe
LV(w)dSqq(ibq) = f
By the definition of Tq
f(TqVqi)(w)thq =
36f {(1— q')[C(u(w,O))—Ol(w)y}+q'V(g(w,O))}ddbq. DxO
Sincetin,i,,g,, minimize the right hand side of (3.1),




= L1 - q')Vq(w)+ q'V(w)}dq
where the last equality follows from (5.4) and (5.5). By the in-
duction hypothesis,
f{(i
- q')Vq(w)+ q'(w)}didbq ￿ f Vq(w)dbq.
Thus,
f (TqiV)(w)d'hq￿ fVq(w)dq.
Sincelim,, IVq =Vqiwe have proved that
fVqi(w)di,bq￿ fVq(w)dihq.
ByLemma 5.5, ,bq first order stochastically dominates i'iwhen
q'> q. Then sinceis increasing in w,
fVq(w)dibq ￿ fVq'(w)dbq ￿ fvq(w)dbq
andwe are done.
376. Conclusion:
In this paper, we have presented a model of the long run
consequences of efficient unemployment insurance for the distri-
bution of welfare and consumption in a simple environment in
which workers face idiosyncratic, serially uncorrelated employ-
ment risk. Under the assumptions of the preceding sections, there
exists an invariant distribution of utility entitlements and an as-
sociated invariant distribution of consumption and employment.
The invariant distribution has a mass point at the lower bound
on utility entitlements ()andalso distributes probability over
higher entitlement levels. The existence of a mass point follows
from Thomas and Worrall's (1990) proof that entitlements to
utility must converge to their lower bound with probability one.
In our case, the lower bound on entitlements serves as a reflecting
barrier rather than an absorbing one as in Thomas and Worrall.
It is clear, then, that if the lower bound on entitlements were
removed, no steady state would exist.
The dynamics of an individual's entitlement within the in-
variant distribution are described by the solution to a one-on-
one principal agent contracting problem between the individual
worker and an unemployment insurance intermediary. In that
contracting problem, the intermediary minimizes the resource
cost, evaluated at a ñxed intertemporal price given by q, of
38providing incentive compatible unemployment insurance to the
worker. The first order conditions of that problem indicate that,
when the minimum utility constraint is not binding, the worker's
entitlements to discounted expected utility are set so that the
ratio of the expected marginal cost to the intermediary of the
worker's entitlement next period and the marginal cost to the
intermediary of the worker's entitlement in the current period
is set equal the intertemporal price set by q. When the min-
imum entitlement constraint is binding, this ratio of marginal
costs exceeds the intertemporal price given by q. These first or-
der conditions, and the dynamics of individual consumption im-
plied by these first order conditions, are qualitatively very similar
to those obtained from a model like Hansen and Imrohoroglu's
in which consumption smoothing is achieved through pure credit
markets with uncontingent borrowing and lending. In particular,
as in Hansen and Imrohoroglu, when the minimum entitlement
constraint is not binding, idiosyncratic movements in individual
consumption in response to realizations of employment risk are
highly persistent and in equilibrium follow a downward drift until
the minimum entitlement constraint binds. When the minimum
entitlement constraint is binding, then workers who fail to find a
job opportunity experience a transitory fall in consumption while
agents who find a job opportunity experience a persistent rise
39in their consumption. The quantitative differences between the
equilibrium in this model and that in Hansen and Imrohoroglu
would manifest themselves in the divergence between the lifetime
utility and discounted present value of consumption of agents who
are lucky in finding employment and agents who are unlucky.
In this model we have assumed that workers experience seri-
ally uncorrelated employment risk. It is clear that if one were to
use this model to establish a benchmark against which to judge
the efficiency of existing unemployment insurance schemes, it
would be necessary to adapt the techniques used here to the
analysis of the efficient invariant distribution of a model like
Hansen and Imrohoroglu's in which this employment risk is se-
rially correlated so as to match the risk in the model to data
on the distribution of the length of employment and unemploy-
ment spells. We leave this to future work. At this point, we
conclude with remarks on two questions that we have left aside
in the body of the paper. The first of these questions concerns
the role of our assumption that agents in the model cannot enter
into contracts that would leave them at any point in time with
discounted expected utility in some states of nature below some
minimal entitlement to discounted expected utility. The second
question concerns the possibilities for decentralizing the efficient
allocation found in this model.
40Regarding the role of the minimum entitlement constraint,
we motivate our assumption prohibiting agents from entering
agreements that require that they forgo all claims to future con-
sumption in certain states of nature with the idea that ancestors
in a dynasty have limited rights to sell the consumption of their
heirs. Phelan (1993) motivates the same assumption in a simi-
lar model with the idea that workers cannot legally commit to
remain in a contract that delivers them a discounted expected
utility below the level that they could obtain by entering a new
unemployment insurance contract with another insurance inter-
mediary. In either case, by introducing this form of contract
incompleteness into the model, we get the result that there is
a non-degenerate steady state distribution of entitlements. This
result introduces the following trade-off between equilibrium ef-
ficiency and equality into the model: stricter limits on agents'
rights to trade away claims to future consumption reduce steady
state inequality at the expense of limiting possibilities for insur-
ing idiosyncratic employment risk and thus reducing welfare ex-
ante. Relaxing these limits on contracting enhances efficiency at
the cost of widening the spread in the long run distribution of en-
titlements and consumption. This tension between equality and
efficiency arises in the model because onsiderations of efficiency
dictate that movements in individual consumption be persistent
41in response to uninsured idiosyncratic shocks while equality re-
quires that the movement of individual consumption in response
to idiosyncratic shocks be bounded or show some mean reversion.
Regarding the possibilities for decentralizing the efficient al-
location found here, the technique we use for finding the efficient
allocation itself suggests one decentralization in which financial
intermediaries compete in offering unemployment insurance con-
tracts to clients who are then bound to work and consume as in-
structed by the intermediary for the rest of time, subject to the
minimum entitlement constraint imposed on contracts. These
intermediaries can be thought of as trading resources with each
other through time at the price q in their competition to de-
velop the low-cost dynamic unemployment insurance contract.
One might think of the market as one in which workers join risk
pools to sign long term contracts with insurance companies who
then control the worker's consumption and work effort over time.
The difficulty with this market interpretation, as is well known,
is that, to implement the contract solved for here, the insurance
intermediary must have the ability to prevent the worker from
participating in any other asset market activity.
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